The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in the More Than Water Private Limited v. Nesco passing off dispute involving “WATERBOX”, “MORE THAN WATERBOX” and “MY WATER BOX”, stressed that parties seeking interim equitable relief must approach the Court with clean hands, full disclosure and credible evidence.

The Court declined interim relief to the plaintiff, finding that it had failed to establish prima facie goodwill and reputation and had relied on prima facie unreliable invoices. At the same time, the defendant was also criticised for relying on prima facie fabricated photographs and invoices before the Trademarks Registry to support its claimed prior use.

The Division Bench further held that “WATERBOX” was prima facie descriptive and non-distinctive. Although the rival marks appeared prima facie similar, the questions of deceptive similarity and likelihood of confusion were left open for trial.

Background of the Dispute

More Than Water Private Limited manufactures and sells packaged drinking water in paper-based tetra packs under the mark “MORE THAN WATERBOX, .” Its predecessor, M/s Meera Enterprises, allegedly coined and adopted “WATERBOX” and “WATERBOX IS THE RIGHT CHOICE” in 2018, with the associated IP rights later assigned to the plaintiff upon its incorporation in 2022.

In January 2026, the plaintiff discovered that Nesco had obtained registration for the device mark “MY WATER BOX” in Class 32, claiming use since October 2020. The plaintiff alleged that Nesco’s coloured mark was deceptively similar to its marks, particularly due to the shared expression “WATER BOX,” a similar wave device, and comparable presentation on tetra packs.

Alleging that the defendant’s adoption and use were likely to cause confusion and misrepresentation of an association with the plaintiff’s business, the plaintiff instituted a passing off action and sought an interim injunction restraining use of the impugned mark.

Single Judge Refuses Absolute Interim Injunction

The Single Judge held that the plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case of goodwill and reputation, finding its evidence of prior use and sales unreliable and insufficient to show continuous commercial use or substantial market presence. The Court also noted inconsistencies between the plaintiff’s trademark filings and its claimed use and found that the alleged use of the mark on tetra-packaged drinking water during 2018–2020 appeared prima facie inconsistent with applicable BIS regulations.

As goodwill was not established, the Court did not examine misrepresentation and damage in detail. However, instead of granting an absolute injunction, it imposed a limited territorial restraint, permitting the plaintiff to sell only in Gujarat and the defendant only in Maharashtra. Both parties challenged aspects of this order before the Division Bench.

Plaintiff’s Submissions Before the Division Bench

The plaintiff argued that the Single Judge erred in refusing a nationwide injunction and restricting its sales to Gujarat, contending that it was entitled to sell across India, including through e-commerce platforms, and had applied for a Central FSSAI licence. It also submitted that the territorial restraint was imposed suo motu, despite the defendant not seeking such relief.

On goodwill, the plaintiff argued that the Court had applied an unduly high threshold, as prior adoption and use could suffice in a passing off action without proof of extensive reputation. It alleged that Nesco had falsely claimed use since October 2020 and relied on fabricated photographs and unreliable invoices, asserting that genuine commercial use began only in 2025, supported by a 2025 invoice, Instagram launch post and website activity.

The plaintiff further contended that “WATERBOX” was the dominant element of both marks and that “MORE THAN WATERBOX” and “MY WATER BOX” were deceptively similar. It also alleged copying of its trade dress, tetra pack presentation and wave device. Given that packaged drinking water is a mass-market, low-involvement product, these similarities, it argued, created a substantial likelihood of consumer confusion.

Defendant’s Defence

Nesco submitted that its defence was based on its actual commercial use commencing in 2025, rather than its trademark registration or any alleged use before that period. It supported the finding that the plaintiff had failed to establish goodwill, alleging that the plaintiff’s use was sporadic and its purported 2020 invoices were fabricated.

The defendant also questioned the legality of the plaintiff’s pre-2020 use of tetra-packaged water in light of applicable FSSAI, GST and other regulatory requirements. It contended that the plaintiff’s State FSSAI licence did not permit pan-India sales and that its application for a Central licence had been rejected, which the plaintiff allegedly failed to disclose to the Court.

Nesco, in contrast, claimed to have obtained a Central FSSAI licence in July 2025 and commenced commercial sales in October 2025. It therefore argued that, in the absence of established prior goodwill, the plaintiff could not sustain a passing off claim.

Division Bench Finds Plaintiff Had Approached the Court with Unclean Hands

The Division Bench upheld the denial of interim injunction, holding that the plaintiff had failed to establish credible prior use of “WATERBOX.” The invoices relied upon since 2020 contained an incorrect HSN code that was not applicable to water, and the plaintiff could neither satisfactorily explain the discrepancy nor produce supporting GST records. In the absence of contemporaneous corroboration, the invoices appeared prima facie manipulated and could not establish prior use.

The Court also noted the plaintiff’s failure to disclose that its Central FSSAI licence application had been rejected, despite relying on the pending application to claim an ability to expand sales beyond Gujarat.

The Division Bench held that reliance on prima facie manipulated invoices, coupled with suppression of the FSSAI rejection, showed that the plaintiff had approached the Court with unclean hands. Since interim injunction is an equitable and discretionary remedy, the plaintiff’s conduct disentitled it to such relief.

Defendant Also Comes Under Strong Judicial Criticism

The Division Bench held that Nesco’s conduct required scrutiny independently of the plaintiff’s failure to establish its case. The Court found that Nesco had relied on prima facie fabricated photographs and unreliable invoices before the Trademarks Registry to claim use of “MY WATER BOX” since 2020. The invoices were suspect as they recorded product quantities without prices, contrary to ordinary commercial practice. Although Nesco later stated that it would not rely on its registration or alleged prior use, the Court criticised the manner in which the registration appeared to have been obtained, observing that it was unfortunate that registration had been secured on the basis of documents that appeared prima facie fabricated.

Court Condemns Both Parties for Fabricated Documents

The Division Bench strongly condemned both parties’ reliance on prima facie fabricated invoices and false documents, warning that such conduct undermines the administration of justice and reflects a serious lack of corporate ethics. The Court stressed that invoices are important fiscal records underlying GST and income-tax compliance, making their manipulation particularly serious. It directed that the disputed invoices be subjected to strict proof at trial and cautioned that perjury proceedings could follow if they are found to be fabricated.

“WATERBOX” Found Prima Facie Descriptive

The Division Bench held that the Plaintiff failed to establish proprietary rights in “WATERBOX”, which was prima facie considered descriptive and non-distinctive, conveying the idea of “water in a box.” Although the competing marks “MORE THAN WATERBOX” and “MY WATER BOX” appeared prima facie similar due to the common expression “WATERBOX” and wave device, similarity alone was insufficient for an interim injunction. The Plaintiff’s lack of goodwill, reliance on unreliable evidence, and failure to make complete disclosure further weakened its case. The issues of deceptive similarity and likelihood of confusion were left open for trial.

Territorial Injunction Vacated

The Division Bench vacated the territorial injunction, permitting both parties to sell their respective products beyond the earlier territorial restrictions, subject to regulatory compliance. The Plaintiff was specifically directed to comply with its FSSAI licence, while the Defendant’s statement regarding sales outside Maharashtra was made binding for determining territorial jurisdiction at trial.

The Court also restrained the Defendant from asserting its trademark registration against third parties during the suit, given prima facie concerns regarding the documents used to obtain the registration. If the documents are proved genuine, the registration may be relied upon; if fabricated, appropriate consequences, including perjury proceedings, may follow. The Court further clarified that the Defendant’s continued use of the mark during the proceedings would not create any equitable rights in its favour.

Conclusion

The decision reiterates that interim injunctions are discretionary and equitable remedies requiring credible evidence and full disclosure. Despite prima facie similarity between the marks, the Plaintiff failed to establish goodwill and relied on questionable documents. The Court also criticised the Defendant’s unreliable records, highlighting that commercial credibility, evidentiary integrity and the conduct of both parties are crucial in trademark litigation.

Key Takeaways

1. Clean hands are essential: Suppression of material facts or regulatory developments can defeat a claim for interim equitable relief.
2. Prior use requires credible evidence: Trademark use must be supported by genuine, contemporaneous and verifiable commercial records.
3. Defendants are equally accountable: Questionable evidence placed before the Trademarks Registry remains subject to judicial scrutiny.
4. Descriptive elements have limited protection: Prima facie descriptive and non-distinctive common elements may not support proprietary rights.
5. Similarity alone is insufficient: Prima facie similarity does not automatically warrant an injunction; goodwill, conduct and evidentiary credibility also matter.
6. Fabricated records carry serious consequences: False invoices and documents may lead to perjury proceedings and consequences for responsible officers.

The internet has blurred traditional ideas of territoriality. Businesses now rely on cloud infrastructure, data is stored and processed across borders, artificial intelligence models are trained on servers in different countries, and digital intermediaries operate through globally distributed networks. Against this backdrop, defendants in intellectual property disputes increasingly argue that Indian courts lack jurisdiction simply because their servers are located outside India or they are based outside India. Indian courts have consistently rejected such a broad proposition. Server location is relevant context, but it is not decisive. The real enquiry is whether Indian law provides a basis for jurisdiction, whether the defendant has purposefully engaged with India, whether the alleged infringement or injury has occurred in India, and whether the court can grant effective relief.

The Delhi High Court’s recent decision in ANI Media Pvt. Ltd. v. OpenAI has brought these questions back into focus. Its reasoning builds on a developing line of Indian decisions which recognises that, in the digital environment, jurisdiction depends on where the cause of action arises and, on the defendant’s, purposeful connection with India.

This article traces the development of that approach through India’s leading internet-jurisdiction cases and considers how it now applies to generative AI. It focuses on four questions: the statutory basis for jurisdiction; the defendant’s purposeful or commercial engagement with India; the location of the alleged infringement or injury; and the court’s ability to grant meaningful relief despite foreign-hosted infrastructure.

Governing framework

Territorial jurisdiction in India is governed primarily by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. In intellectual property disputes, special provisions, notably Section 62 of the Copyright Act, 1957 and Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, provide an additional basis for approaching a court.

Within that framework, server location is only one factual consideration. Courts instead look at the defendant’s commercial presence or targeting of India, the place where the alleged harm is felt, and whether exercising jurisdiction is necessary to provide an effective remedy.

Evolution of Indian digital-jurisdiction jurisprudence

Indian case law reflects a clear progression. The early decisions distinguished purposeful targeting from mere online accessibility. Later cases recognised that digital transactions could create a genuine commercial nexus with the forum. More recently, courts have emphasised that foreign-hosted systems should not make domestic remedies ineffective.

Banyan Tree: Moving beyond mere accessibility

The modern framework began with the Delhi High Court’s decision in Banyan Tree Holding (P) Ltd. v. A. Murali Krishna Reddy (2010).

The Court rejected the idea that a website’s mere accessibility in India is enough to confer jurisdiction. Instead, it adopted a “purposeful availment” test: a foreign defendant must have intentionally targeted Indian consumers or directed commercial activity towards India.

Banyan Tree therefore shifted the focus away from the location of digital infrastructure and towards the defendant’s deliberate relationship with the forum. Accessibility alone was not enough; purposeful commercial targeting could be.

WWE v. Reshma Collection: Carrying on business through e-commerce

The next important development came in World Wrestling Entertainment Inc. v. Reshma Collection & Ors., where the Delhi High Court considered whether a foreign rights-holder could be said to carry on business in Delhi through online commercial activity.

Although the plaintiff had no physical office in Delhi, its programmes were broadcast there, its merchandise was available there, and Delhi consumers could purchase its goods and services through its website. The Division Bench held that “carrying on business” could not be confined to a brick-and-mortar presence when essential commercial transactions were concluded online.

WWE connected the statutory test with the idea of purposeful targeting. Where online transactions are directed at and completed with consumers in the forum, a business may be treated as operating there even without a local office or agent. Deliberate e-commerce activity can therefore provide both the commercial nexus and the purposeful connection needed for territorial jurisdiction.

India TV: Recognising commercial nexus

In India TV Independent News Service Pvt. Ltd. v. India Broadcast Live LLC, the Delhi High Court reaffirmed that internet disputes require a practical and commercial approach. The Court recognised jurisdiction because the defendant’s online activities had a sufficient connection with India and were capable of causing confusion and injury within the country.

India TV added another dimension- the place where the harm is felt. The Court considered whether the defendant’s conduct had a sufficient connection with India and was capable of causing confusion or injury. The enquiry therefore extended beyond conduct directed at India to the territorial effect of that conduct.

Swami Ramdev: Effective remedies in a borderless internet

The problem became still more apparent in Swami Ramdev v. Facebook Inc., which concerned allegedly defamatory material available across the world.

The Delhi High Court granted a global injunction directing the intermediaries to disable access to the offending material. It recognised that relief confined to India could be ineffective when digital content moves effortlessly across borders.

Swami Ramdev thus developed the remedial limb of the jurisdictional enquiry. Once a sufficient territorial nexus exists, the remedy must reflect the borderless way in which digital content is disseminated. The location of servers should not make judicial protection illusory.

Tata Sons v. Hakunamatata: Targeting India through foreign digital platforms

The principle was carried forward in Tata Sons Private Limited v. Hakunamatata Tata Founders & Ors. The defendants were foreign entities accused of using the TATA mark for cryptocurrency offerings promoted through websites accessible in India.

The Division Bench stressed that the central question was not where the defendants were located, but whether their online conduct showed purposeful targeting of Indian consumers. Website accessibility remained insufficient by itself. However, interactive commercial activity, Indian traffic, references to Indian users or programmes, and the use of a mark enjoying an exceptional reputation in India could, taken together, establish a sufficient nexus for interim protection.

Tata Sons reaffirmed the targeting test in the context of newer digital business models, including cryptocurrency and tokenised offerings. Foreign incorporation or infrastructure does not insulate an online actor whose interactive conduct is aimed at India and allegedly harms Indian intellectual property rights.
Neetu Singh v. Telegram: Server location cannot become a jurisdictional shield

These decisions identify the factors that can establish territorial jurisdiction: a statutory basis, purposeful targeting, commercial activity and injury within the forum. Neetu Singh v. Telegram FZ LLC addressed the question directly and examined if connections to India and purposeful targeting can be displaced merely because the relevant data is stored abroad?

Telegram resisted disclosure orders on the ground that user information was stored on servers outside India. The Delhi High Court rejected that argument, observing that treating foreign server location as decisive would leave Indian copyright owners without an effective remedy against online infringement.

Neetu Singh made the principle explicit. Once the alleged infringement, injury and need for relief are sufficiently connected with India, a platform cannot avoid jurisdiction or enforcement obligations simply by storing data on foreign servers. Server geography is a technical fact; it is not a shield.

ANI v. OpenAI: Applying settled principles to generative AI

The Delhi High Court recently applied these principles in ANI Media Pvt. Ltd. v. OpenAI, one of India’s first major copyright disputes involving generative artificial intelligence.

OpenAI argued that the alleged copying occurred outside India because its large language models were trained on servers in the United States. On that basis, it contended that Indian courts lacked territorial jurisdiction.

The Court rejected this submission by applying the same four-part framework. ANI, an Indian copyright owner carrying on business in Delhi, could invoke the special jurisdiction under Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act. OpenAI purposefully served the Indian market by making ChatGPT and paid subscription services available to Indian users. The allegedly infringing outputs could be generated and consumed in India, linking the asserted injury and part of the cause of action to the forum. Finally, treating overseas server location as decisive would undermine the court’s ability to grant effective relief.

The Court also observed that storing copyrighted material on foreign servers is only one step in a wider chain of events connected with India. Accepting OpenAI’s position would allow digital platforms to avoid Indian law simply by placing their servers abroad.

Drawing on Neetu Singh, the Court held, on a prima facie basis, that foreign server location does not oust the jurisdiction of Indian courts when a substantial part of the cause of action arises in India.

Conclusion

Global cloud infrastructure has unquestionably made questions of jurisdiction more complex, but Indian courts have responded pragmatically. Banyan Tree and Tata Sons explain what purposeful targeting looks like. WWE shows when online transactions amount to carrying on business. India TV links jurisdiction to injury within the forum, while Swami Ramdev highlights the importance of effective relief. Neetu Singh states the consequence plainly: a foreign server is a technical circumstance, not a jurisdictional determinant.

The decision in ANI v. OpenAI is a natural extension of this jurisprudence. It confirms that multinational technology companies cannot sidestep Indian copyright law merely by pointing to the geographical location of their servers.

In a recent decision, the High Court of Delhi considered whether a plaintiff that had instituted a passing-off action could amend its plaint to add a claim for trade mark infringement after securing registration of the mark during the pendency of the suit. The judgment affirms that procedural law should facilitate the effective adjudication of disputes and permit subsequent developments that materially affect the parties’ rights to be brought on record.

Brief Facts

L’Oréal instituted a passing-off suit concerning its mark GARNIER BRIGHT COMPLETE, challenging the Defendants’ use of the marks GARUDA BRIGHT COMPLETE 30x and 6 DROPS BRIGHT COMPLETE 3x VITAMIN C. During the pendency of the suit before the Trial Court, L’Oréal obtained registration for the device mark of the product subject matter of the suit. It thereafter applied under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), to amend the plaint, place the registration on record, and add a claim for trade mark infringement.

The Trial Court dismissed the application, holding that the original plaint did not disclose the pendency of the trade mark application and that the proposed amendment would introduce a new cause of action and alter the nature of the suit. It also noted that evidence had already concluded and considered that permitting the amendment at that stage would effectively reopen the proceedings.

Aggrieved by the dismissal, L’Oréal invoked the Delhi High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and challenged the Trial Court’s order.

Contentions raised before the High Court:

L’Oréal submitted that:

1. The amendment was necessary to determine the real controversy between the parties.
2. Its infringement claim arose only after registration was granted during the suit. A separate action was unnecessary because the parties, marks, products, and underlying facts were the same.
3. Refusing the amendment would result in duplicative proceedings concerning the same marks and products.
4. The Respondents, having been proceeded against ex parte before the Trial Court, could not oppose the petition.

Respondents’ contentions:

The Respondents defended the Trial Court’s order, arguing that the amendment introduced a fresh cause of action, altered the nature of the suit, and relied on a trade mark application not disclosed in the original plaint.

Court’s Decision:

The Delhi High Court set aside the Trial Court’s order and allowed the amendment on the following grounds:

1. An amendment necessary to resolve the real controversy may be allowed at any stage; commencement of trial is not, by itself, a ground for refusal.
2. Subsequent facts and reliefs may be brought on record provided they do not fundamentally alter the nature of the suit.
3. A post-registration infringement claim may be added where it arises from the same facts, marks, and products as the passing-off claim.
4. Courts should adopt a liberal, rather than hyper-technical, approach to bona fide and necessary amendments.
5. As both claims concerned the same marks, products, and facts, refusing the amendment would cause duplicative proceedings. The Respondents were also ex parte, leaving no reason to prolong parallel litigation.

Conclusion

The decision affirms that a plaintiff may amend a passing-off suit to add an infringement claim when registration is obtained during the proceedings and both claims arise from the same facts. It reinforces that procedural rules should facilitate effective adjudication and avoid duplicative litigation.

In a significant ruling concerning the arbitrability of trademark disputes arising from contractual arrangements, the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court allowed an appeal against an order of the District Judge (Commercial), South District, Delhi, and referred the dispute between the parties to arbitration under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

The appeal arose from the dismissal of the defendant’s application seeking reference of disputes to arbitration in terms of the arbitration clause contained in the Partner Agreement executed between the parties. The Division Bench held that the trademark dispute had a direct nexus with the contractual obligations between the parties and was therefore required to be referred to arbitration.

Background of the Dispute

The plaintiff, Newgen Software Technologies Ltd., is the proprietor of several registered trademarks incorporating the mark “NEWGEN” as the dominant element across various classes. The plaintiff asserted that the NEWGEN marks had acquired substantial goodwill and reputation through extensive commercial use, supported by its turnover figures, advertising expenditure, and promotional activities.

The defendant, originally incorporated as VCARE INFOTECH SOLUTIONS & SERVICES PRIVATE LIMITED, was engaged in providing services similar to those of the plaintiff. In July 2023, the parties entered into a Partner Agreement, under which the defendant acknowledged the plaintiff’s exclusive rights in the NEWGEN marks and agreed to use such marks only in accordance with the terms of the Agreement.

Intellectual Property Provisions under the Partner Agreement

Article 14 of the Partner Agreement recognized NEWGEN as the exclusive property of the plaintiff and granted the defendant only a limited right to use approved NEWGEN trademarks during the term of the Agreement for the sale and distribution of Newgen products. The defendant expressly acknowledged the plaintiff’s trademark rights, acquired no proprietary interest through such use, and undertook to assist the plaintiff in protecting its trademark rights against infringement.

Article 15 provided that all intellectual property rights in Newgen’s software, products, designs, engineering details, and related materials remained exclusively vested with the plaintiff. The defendant and end customers were granted only a limited, non-exclusive, and non-transferable licence to use the software, without acquiring any ownership rights.

Article 18 contained the arbitration clause, providing that all disputes or differences arising between the parties would be resolved through arbitration in accordance with the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The arbitration was to be conducted in New Delhi under Indian law.

Alleged Trademark Infringement and Institution of Suit

In July 2024, the defendant changed its corporate name to NEWGEN IT TECHNOLOGIES LIMITED and also applied for registration of NEWGEN formative marks. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s actions amounted to unauthorized appropriation of its trademarks.

Consequently, by letter dated September 15, 2024, the plaintiff terminated the Partner Agreement and called upon the defendant to immediately cease using the NEWGEN marks.

The defendant refused to comply with the cease-and-desist demand, following which the plaintiff instituted proceedings alleging trademark infringement and passing off, claiming that the defendant was attempting to misrepresent its goods and services as those of the plaintiff.

Defendant’s Application under Section 8 of the Arbitration Act

Upon being served with the suit, the defendant filed an application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, seeking reference of the dispute to arbitration under Article 18 of the Partner Agreement.

The defendant contended that the dispute arose directly from the Agreement, particularly Article 14 governing trademark usage rights. It was argued that trademark infringement disputes are not inherently non-arbitrable and that the arbitral tribunal was competent to determine its own jurisdiction under Section 16 of the Act.

District Court’s Decision

The District Judge dismissed the Section 8 application, holding that the arbitration clause ceased to operate after termination of the Partner Agreement and the defendant’s change of corporate name. The Court also observed that the Agreement did not expressly bind successors or altered entities.

Aggrieved by the decision, the defendant approached the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court.

Submissions Before the Division Bench

Defendant’s Submissions

The defendant argued that, at the stage of considering an application under Section 8, the Court was required only to ascertain the prima facie existence of an arbitration agreement.
As the dispute arose from an alleged breach of Article 14 of the Partner Agreement and Article 18 expressly covered disputes arising under the Agreement, the matter was required to be referred to arbitration.

Plaintiff’s Submissions

The plaintiff contended that the dispute was a trademark infringement action concerning intellectual property rights, which constituted rights in rem and were therefore non-arbitrable.

The Partner Agreement merely regulated channel-partner activities and did not govern enforcement of intellectual property rights.

The arbitration clause could not survive termination of the Agreement and that the defendant had waived its right to seek arbitration by submitting to the court proceedings.

Delhi High Court’s Analysis and Findings

Change of Corporate Name Does Not Extinguish Contractual Obligations

The Division Bench rejected the Commercial Court’s finding that the arbitration agreement became inapplicable merely because the defendant changed its corporate name.

The Court observed that a change in the name of a company does not extinguish its contractual rights and obligations. Accepting such a proposition would permit parties to avoid contractual liabilities merely by changing their corporate identity.

Accordingly, the Commercial Court’s reasoning was held to be legally unsustainable.

Reliance on the Supreme Court’s Interplay Judgment

The Division Bench placed reliance on the seven-Judge Constitution Bench decision of the Supreme Court in In Re: Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, which reaffirmed important principles relating to arbitration law, including:

1. the doctrine of separability;
2. the principle of kompetenz-kompetenz under Section 16; and
3. limited judicial scrutiny at the referral stage under Sections 8 and 11.

The Supreme Court held that an arbitration agreement is legally independent from the underlying contract and continues to survive despite the invalidity, termination, repudiation, or frustration of the main contract, unless the arbitration agreement itself is specifically challenged.

The Division Bench observed that the arbitration clause therefore continued to operate even after termination of the Partner Agreement and remained available for resolution of disputes arising from such termination.

Arbitrability of Trademark Disputes

The Court reiterated that arbitrability involves a jurisdictional question and that, under Section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, the arbitral tribunal is competent to determine its own jurisdiction.

While distinguishing between:

1. rights in rem, which are enforceable against the world at large and generally considered non-arbitrable; and
   rights in personam, which operate between specific parties and are generally arbitrable,
2. the Court clarified that disputes involving subordinate contractual rights in personam arising from rights in rem may still be referred to arbitration.

Applying these principles, the Court held that the present dispute was not a standalone trademark infringement claim but arose from the contractual relationship between the parties.

The defendant’s alleged infringement was founded on the breach of the Partner Agreement, which expressly regulated the defendant’s use of the NEWGEN trademarks. Therefore, the dispute had a direct and substantial nexus with the Agreement and fell within the scope of the arbitration clause.

Decision

The Division Bench allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the District Court, and allowed the defendant’s application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

The parties were consequently referred to arbitration in accordance with Article 18 of the Partner Agreement.

Key Takeaways

1. An arbitration clause survives termination of the underlying contract by virtue of the doctrine of separability.
2. A change in corporate identity does not absolve a party from contractual obligations.
3. Questions of arbitrability should ordinarily be determined by the arbitral tribunal under Section 16.
4. Trademark disputes arising from contractual obligations may be arbitrable, particularly where the alleged infringement is founded upon breach of an agreement containing an arbitration clause.
5. Courts exercising jurisdiction under Section 8 must limit their inquiry to the existence of an arbitration agreement and whether any statutory bar prevents reference to arbitration.

CS(COMM) 1028/2024, I.A. 45301/2024 & I.A.26192/2025

Date of decision 24th July 2026

This judgment is among the first significant Indian decisions to examine how traditional copyright principles apply to generative artificial intelligence and large language models. In refusing interim relief to ANI Media Pvt. Ltd., the Delhi High Court considered whether OpenAI’s use of publicly available news content for training ChatGPT, and the generation of responses through ChatGPT, amounted to copyright infringement or was protected as fair dealing under Section 52 of the Copyright Act, 1957. The ruling is notable for its treatment of AI training, retrieval-augmented generation, commercial use, market substitution and public interest in the development of AI technologies.

Background

Against this backdrop, ANI Media Pvt. Ltd. filed a copyright infringement suit against OpenAI OpCo LLC before the Delhi High Court, alleging unauthorised use of ANI’s copyrighted news content in connection with ChatGPT. ANI advanced two principal claims: (a) that OpenAI copied and stored ANI’s works to train its large language models; and (b) that ChatGPT generated outputs that reproduced, or were substantially similar to, ANI’s copyrighted works.

The Court noted that the case raised novel questions at the intersection of copyright law and artificial intelligence. Since the Copyright Act, 1957 was enacted long before the emergence of generative AI and large language models, the Court approached the dispute by examining how existing copyright principles should apply to technologies that rely on large-scale data collection, storage, tokenisation, model training and retrieval-augmented generation.

Issues

1. Whether OpenAI’s storage of ANI’s copyrighted data for training ChatGPT amounted to infringement of ANI’s copyright.
2. Whether ChatGPT’s generation of responses using ANI’s copyrighted data amounted to infringement of ANI’s copyright.
3. Whether OpenAI’s use of ANI’s copyrighted data qualified as fair dealing under Section 52 of the Copyright Act, 1957.
4. Whether Indian courts had jurisdiction to entertain the suit, given that OpenAI’s servers and training infrastructure were located outside India.

Contentions of the Parties

ANI’s Contentions

ANI’s case was that OpenAI had used its copyrighted news content without permission. ANI alleged that OpenAI copied, stored and processed ANI’s news articles and other literary works while training ChatGPT. According to ANI, the fact that its works were available on the internet did not make them free for unrestricted use, nor did it dilute ANI’s copyright in the original expression of its reports.

ANI also characterised the technical steps involved in AI training, scraping, storage, tokenisation and vectorisation as acts of reproduction or adaptation in electronic form. ANI argued that the conversion of text into machine-readable formats did not take the use outside copyright law; it merely changed the form in which the copyrighted work was copied or processed.

Separately, ANI objected to ChatGPT’s outputs. It argued that certain responses reproduced, paraphrased or substantially copied ANI’s interviews and news reports, thereby amounting to unauthorised communication of its works to the public. ANI said this was not merely a case of using underlying facts, but of appropriating the form and substance of its protected expression.

On fair dealing, ANI’s principal objection was that OpenAI’s use was commercial and could not properly be described as private or personal use, or as research, within the meaning of Section 52(1)(a). ANI also urged the Court not to import the broader US fair use doctrine into Indian law, particularly where large-scale copying of copyrighted works was being justified as AI training.

ANI further submitted that OpenAI’s conduct had commercial consequences for ANI’s business. By making summaries or extracts of ANI’s content available through ChatGPT, ANI argued that OpenAI diverted traffic away from ANI’s own platforms, reduced licensing opportunities and undermined the market for ANI’s news content.

OpenAI’s Contentions

OpenAI first objected to the Court’s jurisdiction over the training claim. It argued that the relevant acts of training and storage took place outside India, on servers located in the United States, and that Indian copyright law should not be applied extraterritorially merely because ChatGPT was accessible in India.

On the merits, OpenAI’s central answer was that ChatGPT does not store or reproduce training data once training is complete. Any copying during training, it said, was only an intermediate and non-expressive step in teaching the model statistical relationships, linguistic patterns and contextual associations. OpenAI maintained that copyright protects original expression, not facts, ideas, news events, grammar, syntax or language patterns.

OpenAI also challenged ANI’s examples of alleged infringement. It pointed out that the articles relied on by ANI were published after the relevant training cut-off dates for OpenAI’s models. On that basis, OpenAI argued that those examples could not prove memorisation or regurgitation from training data. At most, the responses reflected facts, short summaries or material generated through search or RAG-type functionality, rather than reproduction of ANI’s protected expression.

For the fair dealing defence, OpenAI submitted that its use fell within “private or personal use, including research” under Section 52(1)(a) of the Copyright Act. It emphasised that the training process was internal and closed, and that the training material was not made available to the public. OpenAI also argued that commercial use is not automatically excluded from fair dealing, particularly where the statute does not expressly impose a non-commercial limitation.

Finally, OpenAI relied on the broader utility of ChatGPT. It submitted that the technology serves public-facing functions such as research, education, translation, accessibility, summarisation and innovation, and that restricting model training through interim relief would have consequences beyond the parties to the suit.

Contentions of the Intervenors

Intervenors Supporting ANI

1. The Digital News Publishers Association, Indian Music Industry and Federation of Indian Publishers broadly supported ANI.
2. They argued that AI training involves unauthorised copying and storage of copyrighted works and that such use cannot be treated as fair dealing merely because it is technologically complex or machine-readable.
3. They submitted that Section 14(a)(i) gives copyright owners an exclusive right over reproduction, including storage in electronic form, and that temporary or intermediate copying can still amount to infringement.
4. They contended that OpenAI’s use was commercial, large-scale and substitutive, and should not be protected under Section 52(1)(a).
5. They further argued that Indian law does not contain a broad US-style fair use defence and that transformative use should not be imported into Indian copyright law without statutory basis.

Intervenors Supporting OpenAI

1. IGAP Project LLP, Broadband India Forum and Flux AI Labs broadly supported OpenAI.
2. They submitted that LLMs do not ordinarily reproduce training material but learn statistical patterns, relationships and linguistic structures from large datasets.
3. They argued that AI training is a form of research or private use and that requiring licences from every copyright owner would make AI development economically unviable, particularly for Indian AI developers.
4. They contended that ChatGPT’s outputs are materially different from ANI’s articles and do not substitute ANI’s news syndication business.
5. They also emphasised the public interest in access to AI tools, technological innovation and the development of domestic AI systems.

Court Ruling

Jurisdiction

The Court held, prima facie, that it had territorial jurisdiction. ANI’s principal office was in Delhi, OpenAI made its services available to users in India, and the alleged infringing outputs were generated within the jurisdiction of the Court. The Court rejected the argument that the location of servers outside India, by itself, defeated jurisdiction.

Output/Reproduction Claim

The Court held that ANI had not established, at the interim stage, that ChatGPT’s outputs were substantial reproductions of ANI’s copyrighted works. The Court noted that copyright does not protect facts or news events, but only the original form, manner and arrangement of expression. It found that the examples relied on by ANI were not substantially similar when compared with ANI’s works as a whole.

The Court also found that the illustrative ANI articles were published after the relevant training cut-off dates for OpenAI’s models. Therefore, the examples could not support ANI’s allegation that ChatGPT memorised those articles from training data. The Court considered that such outputs were more likely connected to live retrieval or RAG-type functionality, an aspect not specifically pleaded as the foundation of ANI’s claim.

Training/Storage Claim and Fair Dealing

The Court held that storage of a literary work in electronic form is covered by the reproduction right under Section 14(a)(i) of the Copyright Act. However, Section 14 is subject to Section 52, which sets out acts that do not constitute infringement. The Court therefore considered the storage and fair dealing issues together.

Applying a broad and liberal interpretation of Section 52(1)(a), the Court held, prima facie, that OpenAI’s storage of ANI’s works for training LLMs fell within “private or personal use, including research”. It reasoned that AI training is a closed, internal process and can qualify as research when understood in light of technological developments. The Court held that “private” does not mean only use by an individual. It can include use by a company or closed group, provided the use is internal and not made available to the public. The Court adopted a broad reading of “research,” observing that research may be undertaken in commercial settings.

The Court further held that commercial use is not automatically excluded from Section 52(1)(a), since the provision does not expressly restrict the defence to non-commercial use. It also held that the “non-infringing copy” limitation in the Explanation to Section 52(1)(a) applies only to incidental storage of computer programmes, and not to every electronically stored work.

Fairness and Public Interest

For the fairness analysis, the Court considered whether OpenAI’s use was limited to training, whether it caused economic competition or market substitution, and whether ChatGPT served broader public interest. It held, prima facie, that OpenAI’s use was limited to training, that ChatGPT’s functions were fundamentally different from ANI’s news syndication business, and that ANI had not shown loss of market share or subscription revenue.

The Court also found that LLMs and ChatGPT serve important public interests, including education, research, translation, accessibility, software development and access to information. On this basis, the Court held that the purpose and fairness tests under Section 52(1)(a) were satisfied at the interim stage.

Interim Injunction

The Court refused to grant an interim injunction. It held that ANI had not made out a prima facie case of infringement either on the training/storage claim or on the output claim. It also found that the balance of convenience favoured OpenAI, since an injunction could affect the functioning of ChatGPT and have wider implications for AI development.

The Court noted that ANI’s claim was quantifiable in monetary terms, especially since ANI had itself offered a licence to OpenAI. It also considered that ANI and its subscribers had technical options to block crawling or scraping.

Key Takeaways

1. AI training is not treated the same as public reproduction: The Court drew a practical distinction between internal use of works for model training and outward-facing reproduction of those works in outputs. At the interim stage, storage for training could fall within Section 52(1)(a) if it remained internal and did not substitute the copyright owner’s market.
2. Indian fair dealing remains purpose-based: The Court did not import the US four-factor fair use test as binding law. Instead, it assessed the statutory purpose under Section 52(1)(a) and then examined fairness through factors such as market substitution, functional difference and public interest.
3. Commercial use is relevant, but not decisive: OpenAI’s commercial character did not, by itself, defeat the fair dealing defence. The Court focused instead on what the use was for, whether the training material was exposed to the public, and whether the use caused market harm.
4. Evidence of market harm will matter: The Court gave weight to the absence of material showing loss of subscribers, reduced licensing revenue, traffic diversion or market substitution. Future plaintiffs may need stronger evidence of commercial impact, not merely assertions of unauthorised use.
5. News copyright protects expression, not facts: The judgment reinforces that news publishers must show copying of original expression, arrangement or presentation not merely use of underlying facts or events. This makes substantial similarity a demanding test in AI-output disputes involving news content.
6. Technical controls may influence injunctions: The Court noted that ANI and its subscribers had options to block crawling or scraping. That observation may become relevant in future cases when courts assess urgency, balance of convenience and equitable relief.

Background

The dispute arose from a suit filed by Malabar Gold Private Ltd. against M. Manuel, proprietor of “Malabar Fashion Jewellery,” before the Additional District Judge-II, Kozhikode, alleging trademark infringement, copyright infringement, passing off, and related reliefs.

The plaintiff claimed exclusive rights over the registered trademark “MALABAR GOLD” and its logo in Class 14, asserting long and extensive use since 1993.

The defendant contended that it had been using “Malabar Fashion Jewellery” since 1990, argued that “Malabar” is a geographical term incapable of exclusive appropriation, denied any likelihood of confusion, and also pleaded delay and acquiescence.

The District Court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff, holding that the defendant’s mark was deceptively similar and constituted both infringement and passing off. Aggrieved by the decree, the defendant preferred an appeal before the Kerala High Court.

Contentions before the High Court

Before the High Court, the defendant mounted a multi-pronged challenge to the judgment of the District Court.

1. The defendant argued that the plaintiff had failed to establish its ownership of the registered trademark, as the registration stood in the name of Malabar Realtors (P) Ltd., whereas the suit was filed by Malabar Gold Private Ltd. In the absence of evidence establishing the relationship between the two entities or a valid assignment of the trademark, the plaintiff could not claim statutory rights over the mark.
2. The defendant contended that the plaintiff’s business fell under Class 35 (retail services) rather than Class 14 (jewellery goods) and argued that, as both parties held valid trademark registrations in different classes, no injunction for trademark infringement could be granted against the defendant.
3. The defendant also challenged the District Court’s jurisdiction, contending that issues relating to trademark classification and validity fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Registrar of Trademarks and the authorities under the Trademarks Act.
4. The defendant argued that the passing off claim was unsustainable as the plaintiff had failed to prove goodwill, prior user and damage, and could not claim exclusive rights over the geographical word “Malabar” without establishing that it had acquired a secondary meaning.

• The plaintiff contended that the defendant had admitted carrying on jewellery business under Class 14 and therefore could not rely on its Class 35 registration as a defence to the infringement claim.
• The plaintiff argued that the defendant had dishonestly adopted a deceptively similar mark to capitalize on its goodwill, that its trademark registration remained valid and unchallenged, and that the plea of delay was untenable since the issuance of a caution notice ruled out any acquiescence.

The High Court’s Analysis

Registration in Different Classes

The High Court held that although the defendant held a Class 35 registration, it was actually dealing in Class 14 goods. As the plaintiff’s Class 14 registration remained valid and unchallenged, the defendant could not rely on its Class 35 registration to defend the infringement claim.

Civil Court’s Jurisdiction

The High Court held that the District court had jurisdiction to decide the infringement suit since the defendant had neither challenged the validity of the plaintiff’s trademark registration nor raised any statutory defence requiring reference to the Registrar.

Geographical Expressions and Composite Marks

The High Court held that while “Malabar” is a geographical term incapable of exclusive appropriation in isolation, the plaintiff’s composite trademark was entitled to protection. Assessing the rival marks as a whole, the Court found them deceptively similar in their overall trade dress, logo, lettering, colour scheme and commercial impression, making consumer confusion likely.

Passing Off and Proof of Goodwill

The High Court held that while the plaintiff had established prior and continuous use of the mark, a passing off action requires independent proof of goodwill, misrepresentation, and damage. As the plaintiff failed to produce sufficient independent evidence of goodwill before the District Court, the finding of passing off was set aside.

Delay Does Not Constitute Acquiescence

The defendant also relied upon the plaintiff’s delay in instituting proceedings. Rejecting this submission, the High Court reaffirmed the settled principle that mere delay does not amount to acquiescence. Unless there is clear evidence demonstrating intentional waiver, encouragement or consent by the proprietor, delay alone cannot defeat statutory trademark rights. The issuance of a caution notice by the plaintiff further negatived any inference of abandonment.

Conclusion

The Kerala High Court partly modified the decree passed by the District Court. While affirming the findings relating to deceptive similarity, prior user and trademark infringement, it clarified that the plaintiff could not claim an exclusive monopoly over the geographical word “MALABAR” in isolation. The injunction was therefore modified to restrain the defendant only from using any mark, logo, trade dress or overall commercial presentation that was identical or deceptively similar to the plaintiff’s composite mark and likely to cause consumer confusion.

Comment

The judgment serves as a reminder that trademark registration does not automatically confer exclusive rights over every constituent element of a composite mark, particularly where such element is geographical in nature. Equally significant is the Court’s reiteration that while infringement is primarily a statutory remedy flowing from registration, a successful passing off action continues to depend upon strict proof of goodwill, misrepresentation and damage. The decision provides valuable guidance on balancing statutory trademark protection with the public interest in preserving the availability of descriptive and geographical expressions for honest commercial use.

This dispute concerns two leading battery manufacturers-Exide Industries Limited (“Exide”) and Amara Raja Energy and Mobility Limited (“Amara Raja”) and centers on Amara Raja’s alleged imitation of Exide’s distinctive trade dress and resulting passing off. The key question before the Calcutta High Court was whether Amara Raja’s adoption of a similar red-and-white color scheme, packaging style, visual elements, and overall product presentation was likely to confuse consumers and unfairly appropriate the goodwill built around Exide’s well-established brand identity. The High Court found that Exide had established a strong prima facie case and granted interim relief. On appeal, the Supreme Court partly modified the injunction by permitting sale of existing stock already supplied to distributors and retailers, while restraining sale of batteries still in Amara Raja’s possession unless repackaged in a non-red, non-infringing trade dress and directing destruction of unused red cartons bearing the impugned get-up.

Background

1. Exide Industries Ltd., a leading manufacturer of lead-acid batteries with a market presence dating back to 1920, instituted proceedings for trademark infringement and passing off against Amara Raja.
2. Exide relied on its long-standing use of the EXIDE mark, its predominantly red trade dress, red-and-white color combination, registered “EL” mark, and copyrighted “shattered O” device , all of which it asserted had acquired substantial goodwill and operated as source identifiers.
3. Amara Raja, a major competitor known for marketing its batteries under the AMARON brand with a predominantly green trade dress, launched a new battery called “ELITO” in India.
4. Although ELITO had initially been introduced in overseas markets in blue packaging, Amara Raja adopted a red-and-white trade dress for the Indian market, incorporating the letters “EL” and a shattered “O” device. Exide alleged that these elements closely mirrored its own trade dress.
5. Exide contended that Amara Raja deliberately abandoned its long-standing branding to imitate Exide’s established market identity and mislead consumers.

Key Issues

1. Whether Amara Raja’s use of the ELITO mark, red-and-white trade dress, “EL” letters, and shattered “O” device amounted to passing off and trademark infringement.
2. Whether Exide had established sufficient goodwill and distinctiveness in its trade dress and associated elements to warrant protection.

Exide’s Submissions

1. Exide argued that it had built enormous goodwill through more than a century of continuous use of the EXIDE mark and its distinctive red trade dress.
2. It submitted that consumers had come to associate the red-and-white color combination, the “EL” mark and the shattered “O” device exclusively with Exide.
3. Exide submitted that Amara Raja had adopted several distinctive features in combination, including the predominant red color, similar shape and size of the batteries, five-letter word format, “EL” element, shattered “O”, and overall get-up, thereby creating a deceptive overall impression.
4. Exide also emphasized that Amara Raja had historically identified itself with green and had previously criticized red in its advertising, making its sudden adoption of red trade dress suggestive of dishonest intent.
5. Exide argued that passing off must be assessed based on the cumulative impact of the overall trade dress rather than by comparing individual elements separately.

Amara Raja’s Submissions

1. Amara Raja argued that Exide had failed to establish the essential ingredients of passing off, namely goodwill, misrepresentation and damage.
2. Amara Raja submitted that no trader could claim a monopoly over the color red, which was commonly used in the battery industry.
3. Amara Raja maintained that batteries are expensive products purchased with considerable care, making consumer confusion unlikely.
4. Amara Raja argued that the ELITO mark was visually and phonetically distinct from EXIDE.
5. Amara Raja explained that it moved from blue to red packaging because distributors considered the blue packaging insufficiently visible in a crowded marketplace. It denied any intent to imitate Exide.

Court’s Reasoning and Decision

1. The Court held that Exide was not claiming a monopoly over the color red alone, but protection for the overall combination of its red trade dress, “EL” mark, shattered “O” device, and product presentation.
2. It found that Exide had built substantial goodwill through long and extensive use and accepted at the interim stage that consumers associated red with Exide and green with Amara Raja.
3. Amara Raja’s explanation for shifting from blue to red packaging was considered inconsistent, particularly as blue packaging continued internationally while the Indian packaging alone was changed to red.
4. Viewing the competing products, the Court found that Amara Raja’s combined use of similar visual elements was likely to cause confusion among ordinary purchasers with imperfect recollection.
5. The Court therefore held that Exide had made out a strong prima facie case for passing off, with the balance of convenience in its favor and a likelihood of dilution of goodwill if interim protection was denied.
6. Accordingly, it granted an interim injunction restraining Amara Raja from using the impugned trade dress and associated indicia, later extending the compliance period to three months from the date of the order.

Supreme Court’s Interim Order dated May 27, 2026

Amara Raja appealed to the Calcutta High Court’s order dated July 24, 2025 before the Supreme Court. By its interim order dated May 27, 2026, the Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal and modified the High Court’s injunction after considering Amara Raja’s affidavit on remaining stock. The Court noted that manufacturing had stopped before the injunction came into effect and that a substantial number of batteries were lying with distributors, retailers, and Amara Raja itself.

The Supreme Court held that batteries still in Amara Raja’s possession could not be sold in the disputed red trade dress and could be marketed only after being repackaged in a non-red trade dress that did not resemble Exide’s. It also directed that unused red cartons bearing the impugned trade dress be destroyed. However, recognizing that batteries already supplied to distributors and retailers were no longer within Amara Raja’s control, the Court permitted sale of that existing stock. The Court clarified that these directions were confined to the interim injunction and would not influence final adjudication of the trademark and trade dress dispute before the High Court.

Key Takeaway

The decision reinforces that trade dress protection is not confined to individual marks or isolated colors but may extend to the overall visual presentation of a product where that presentation has acquired distinctiveness and goodwill. For brand owners, the ruling reinforces the value of consistently using distinctive product get-up and the importance of acting promptly against lookalike packaging. For competitors, it serves as a reminder that adopting a rival’s distinctive combination of visual elements, even without copying a mark verbatim, may invite injunctive relief where it creates a likelihood of confusion.

CS(Comm) 519/2019 Judgement dated 06 July 2026
Brief Background

1. The dispute concerns trademark rights over the competing marks ‘boAt’ and ‘BOULT’ for smart wearables and audio products, including headphones, earphones and smartwatches.
2. Imagine Marketing Pvt. Ltd. (Plaintiff), owner of the ‘boAt’ brand, filed a suit against Exotic Mile (Defendant), owner of the ‘BOULT’ brand, alleging trademark infringement, passing off, copyright infringement and dilution.

What did the Ld. Single Judge rule?

1. At the initial stage, the Delhi High Court granted an ad interim ex parte injunction restraining the Defendant from using ‘BOULT’ along with its device marks and the tagline “UNPLUG YOURSELF”.
2. By order dated 21 January 2020, the Ld. Single Judge restrained only specified device marks and the tagline but did not expressly restrain use of the standalone word mark ‘BOULT’ or other deceptively similar marks.

What was the ruling of the Division Bench (DB)?

1. The Defendant appealed the order before the Division Bench, which stayed its operation on 27 January 2020 while observing that the competing marks were visually and phonetically different.
2. During the appeal, the Defendant commercially rebranded from ‘BOULT’ to ‘GOBOULT’ and informed the Division Bench of the same.
3. By judgment dated 15 September 2025, the Division Bench affirmed the injunction against the device marks in view of the Defendant’s statements.
4. The DB set aside the restraint on the tagline “UNPLUG YOURSELF”, holding that such relief had not been specifically prayed for by the Plaintiff.
5. The Division Bench also noted that the impugned order did not restrain the standalone word mark ‘BOULT’ or any other marks deceptively similar to the Plaintiff’s ‘boAt’ trademarks.
   1. The Division Bench observed that the Plaintiff had neither sought review, modification or clarification of the impugned order nor filed a cross-appeal against the limited injunction.
   2. Applying Wander Ltd. v. Antox India Pvt. Ltd., it confined itself to the injunction actually granted by the Ld. Single Judge and declined to expand its scope.
   3. It further clarified that the Defendant’s use of ‘GOBOULT’ would constitute a fresh cause of action and was not under challenge in the appeal.
6. After the appellate decision, the Plaintiff filed an application seeking clarification of the Ld. Single Judge’s order dated 21 January 2020, which was withdrawn by the Plaintiff vide Order dated 16th October 2025, after the Ld. Single Judge expressed her doubts on its’ maintainability.

Present Judgement
Subsequently, the Plaintiff filed a successive injunction application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2, CPC, seeking restraint against:

1. The Defendant’s word mark ‘BOULT’;
2. The Defendant’s use of any other mark identical and/or deceptively similar to the Plaintiff’s ‘boAt’ trademarks;

The Plaintiff argued that exclusion of the standalone word mark ‘BOULT’ from the earlier injunction was an inadvertent omission, as the Court had found it phonetically similar to ‘boAt’. It also contended that the Division Bench’s clarification on the scope of the injunction amounted to a changed circumstance justifying a fresh application.
The Defendant opposed the application as an abuse of process, arguing that the Plaintiff was seeking relief already declined in 2020 and had neither sought timely review/clarification nor filed a cross-appeal. It also relied on the doctrine of merger, contending that the appellate judgment governed the parties’ rights and could not be rewritten through a fresh application.
The Court dismissed the application, holding that a successive injunction application is maintainable only upon a material change in circumstances or undue hardship, neither of which was shown. It also accepted the Defendant’s plea of issue estoppel, as the relief sought was substantially identical to the relief earlier considered and not granted.

Key Takeaways from the Judgment

1. Successive injunction applications are not maintainable as a matter of course. A party seeking the same interim relief again must show a genuine change in circumstances or undue hardship; otherwise, the application may be treated as an abuse of process.
2. Delay can be fatal in interim relief. The Plaintiff waited nearly six years after the order dated 21 January 2020 before seeking relief against the standalone word mark BOULT, which weighed against grant of injunction.
3. Estoppel can bar repeated interim relief. Where substantially the same relief has already been considered and not granted, a party may be prevented from seeking it again on the same factual basis.

In a significant judgment concerning trademark protection in the education sector, the Delhi High Court Division Bench (DB) upheld the order of the learned Single Judge refusing to grant an interim injunction in a dispute between two well-known civil services coaching institutes, Vajiram and Ravi Isa Study Centre LLP and Vajirao and Reddy Institute Pvt. Ltd.

The decision reiterates several well-established principles governing passing off actions, including the necessity of proving goodwill in the mark relied upon, the importance of assessing composite marks as a whole, the effect of delay and acquiescence, and the limited scope of appellate interference with discretionary orders granting or refusing interim injunctions.

Background

The Plaintiff, Vajiram and Ravi Isa Study Centre LLP, traces its origins to an institute established under the name “VAJIRAM & RAO”, which was renamed “VAJIRAM & RAVI” in 1976. The Plaintiff owns registered trademarks for both “VAJIRAM & RAO” and “VAJIRAM & RAVI”, including registrations for their respective word and device marks.

The Defendant, Vajirao and Reddy Institute Pvt. Ltd., has been imparting coaching and training for the Civil Services Examination since at least 2007 under the mark “VAJIRAO & REDDY INSTITUTE” and is the registered proprietor of a device mark incorporating the said expression.

Although the Plaintiff did not object to the Defendant conducting a similar coaching business, it contended that the Defendant’s use of the word “VAJIRAO” was deceptively similar to the Plaintiff’s marks “VAJIRAM”, “VAJIRAM & RAO”, and “VAJIRAM & RAVI”. According to the Plaintiff, the Defendant had dishonestly adopted the impugned mark to exploit the goodwill and reputation associated with its long-standing coaching institute. The Plaintiff, therefore, instituted a suit for passing off, dilution and unfair competition, seeking an interim injunction restraining the Defendant from using the impugned mark.

The learned Single Judge declined to grant interim relief, holding that the rival marks, when viewed as a whole, were sufficiently distinct and that the Plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case of consumer confusion. Aggrieved by the refusal of interim relief, the Plaintiff preferred an appeal before the Division Bench.

Plaintiff’s Case

The Plaintiff contended that the rival marks were phonetically, structurally and visually similar, and that the Defendant’s use of “VAJIRAO” in its advertisements, study materials, website and domain name was likely to confuse students, as both parties operated in the same civil services coaching market.

The Plaintiff argued that it became aware of the Defendant’s use only in December 2018 and that the learned Single Judge erred in relying on delay and acquiescence, since delay cannot defeat an injunction where the Defendant’s adoption is dishonest.

The Plaintiff further argued that the Defendant’s standalone use of “VAJIRAO”, particularly in its domain name, reflected a dishonest attempt to exploit the Plaintiff’s goodwill, and that the Defendant’s registration of a composite device mark did not confer exclusive rights over the individual word elements.

Defendant’s Defence

The Defendant supported the findings of the learned Single Judge and argued that the rival composite marks were visually, structurally and phonetically distinct when compared in their entirety.

The Defendant argued that the Plaintiff had failed to establish “VAJIRAM” as the dominant element of its marks and, having been aware of the Defendant’s use since at least 2009 through common advertisements, had acquiesced to such use under Section 33 of the Trademarks Act.

The Defendant maintained that “VAJIRAO & REDDY INSTITUTE”, together with its logo and overall presentation, was sufficiently distinctive and incapable of misleading aspirants preparing for the Civil Services Examination.

Findings of the Division Bench

Plaintiff’s Conduct During the Suit

Before examining the merits of the appeal, the Division Bench expressed concern regarding the Plaintiff’s conduct in prosecuting the suit. Although the suit had been instituted in 2019 and issues were framed in 2020, the Plaintiff had failed to commence recording of evidence despite filing witness affidavits and despite the appointment of a Local Commissioner.

The Court noted that despite the suit being pending since 2019, the Plaintiff had failed to examine any witness by 2026, reflecting a lack of diligence and an absence of evidence to establish goodwill in “VAJIRAM” or likelihood of confusion.

Composite Marks Must Be Compared as a Whole

The Division Bench agreed with the learned Single Judge that the Defendant’s mark could not be dissected by isolating the word “VAJIRAO” from the composite mark “VAJIRAO & REDDY INSTITUTE.”

Applying the anti-dissection principle, the Court held that the rival composite marks were visually, structurally and phonetically distinct when considered as a whole, making confusion unlikely. It also noted that the Plaintiff had not seriously challenged this finding in the appeal.

Failure to Establish Goodwill in “VAJIRAM”

The Division Bench held that the Plaintiff failed to establish prima facie goodwill or reputation in the standalone mark “VAJIRAM”, observing that no evidence of sales, advertising or market recognition had been produced. Reiterating settled law, the Court held that goodwill in a passing off action cannot be presumed and must be proved through cogent evidence.

No Likelihood of Consumer Confusion

The Division Bench held that the Plaintiff failed to establish any prima facie misrepresentation or likelihood of confusion. It agreed that UPSC aspirants were discerning consumers who recognized the two coaching institutes as distinct entities, making consumer confusion unlikely.

Delay and Acquiescence

The Division Bench upheld the learned Single Judge’s findings on delay and acquiescence, holding that the Plaintiff’s claim of first becoming aware of the Defendant in 2018 was implausible given the Defendant’s continuous use since 2007 and both parties’ concurrent advertisements since 2009. The Court observed that the Plaintiff’s prolonged inaction allowed the Defendant to build its own goodwill, weighing against the grant of interim relief.

Essential Ingredients of Passing Off Not Established

The Division Bench held that the Plaintiff failed to establish the essential ingredients of passing off, including goodwill, deceptive similarity, likelihood of confusion and resulting damage. Consequently, it found no case for granting interim protection.

Limited Scope of Appellate Interference

The Division Bench also reaffirmed the settled principle that appellate courts ordinarily do not interfere with discretionary orders granting or refusing interim injunctions unless the exercise of discretion is shown to be arbitrary, perverse or contrary to settled legal principles.

Finding no such infirmity in the order of the learned Single Judge, the Division Bench declined to interfere.

Directions for Expeditious Trial

While dismissing the appeal, the Division Bench criticized the Plaintiff’s lack of diligence in prosecuting the suit, observing that it appeared more interested in obtaining interim relief than pursuing a final decision on merits. It directed the Plaintiff to complete its evidence within a fixed timeline, failing which the suit could be dismissed for non-prosecution.

Conclusion

The decision is a reminder that passing off actions are founded on evidence rather than assertion. A plaintiff seeking interim protection must establish goodwill in the mark relied upon, demonstrate a real likelihood of consumer confusion, and act promptly upon becoming aware of the alleged infringement. The judgment reinforces the anti-dissection principle by emphasizing that composite marks must be assessed as a whole.

The Calcutta High Court rejected IndiaMART’s request for interim relief against OpenAI, holding that there is no legal right to compel a private AI platform to display or promote a business’s links. The Court found that IndiaMART’s grievance was primarily commercial in nature and did not establish trademark infringement, disparagement, copyright infringement, or any independent legal right warranting interim protection.

Background / Facts

1. The case concerned an application for interim relief filed by IndiaMART InterMESH Limited against OpenAI Inc. and others (running ChatGPT).
2. IndiaMART, a B2B e-commerce platform operating since 1996, alleged that ChatGPT Search bypassed IndiaMART listings and instead provided direct seller links, reducing traffic to its platform.
3. IndiaMART also objected to OpenAI’s reliance on the USTR Notorious Markets List, 2024, contending that the list had no legal force in India and was being used discriminatorily.

Issues

The principal issues were:

1. whether IndiaMART had a legal right to compel visibility of its links on ChatGPT;
2. whether OpenAI’s alleged omission amounted to trademark dilution, disparagement, unfair trade practice or copyright infringement;
3. whether ChatGPT was an intermediary or originator under the IT Act; and
4. whether IndiaMART had satisfied the requirements for interim relief.

Contentions of the Parties

IndiaMART contended that

1. ChatGPT deliberately excluded or downgraded its links while giving visibility to competing platforms, causing business loss and discrimination.
2. It argued that ChatGPT functioned as an intermediary under the IT Act and could not arbitrarily suppress access to IndiaMART’s platform.

OpenAI argued that

1. IndiaMART had no contractual, statutory or constitutional “right to visibility” on ChatGPT.
2. It submitted that ChatGPT generated responses as an originator rather than acting as a passive intermediary.
3. No case of trademark infringement, disparagement, trade libel, injurious falsehood or copyright infringement had been made out.

Court Ruling

The Calcutta High Court dismissed IndiaMART’s application for interim relief. The Court held that

1. no private entity can be compelled to promote another private party’s business in the absence of a contractual, statutory or constitutional obligation.
2. IndiaMART’s grievance was essentially one of pure economic loss arising from reduced traffic and visibility.
3. The Court found no prima facie case of trademark infringement, dilution, disparagement or copyright infringement. It held that mere silence or non-display could not amount to disparagement, and referential use of IndiaMART did not constitute trademark dilution.
4. On the question of ChatGPT’s classification under the Information Technology Act, 2000, the Court noted that generative AI does not fit neatly within the existing statutory framework, but expressed the prima facie view that ChatGPT is closer to an originator than a passive intermediary.
5. The Court opined that even assuming ChatGPT were an intermediary, IndiaMART had not shown breach of any independent legal right.

The Court concluded that IndiaMART failed to establish a prima facie case, balance of convenience or irreparable injury. The interim application was therefore dismissed and the suit was directed to proceed expeditiously.

Key Takeaways

1. Businesses do not have an automatic legal right to be displayed, ranked, or promoted by a private AI platform unless such a right arises from contract, statute, or constitutional obligation.
2. Commercial loss arising from reduced traffic or visibility is not enough for interim relief unless accompanied by infringement of a recognised legal right.
3. The dispute was not treated as an IP issue because IndiaMART could not show misuse of its trademark, dilution of its mark, disparagement of its platform, or unauthorised copying of protected content; the complaint was essentially about loss of platform visibility.
4. The judgment highlights the unsettled legal treatment of generative AI platforms under the IT Act, while signalling judicial caution in compelling AI tools to alter how they generate or display results at the interim stage.